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EVERARDO GAliCIA et Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
[1] purpose in 
providing period and 
under circumstances not covered by workmen's compensation 
was not to create duplicating compensations but was to pro-
vide an insurance prog-ram to pay benefits to individuals who 
are unemployed hecause of illness or injury for which no com-
pcnsa tion is otherwise made. 
[2] Id.-Purpose.-Legi.slative intention that a workman shall be 
compensated in part for wag·e loss resulting from unemploy-
ment due to sickness or injury both where disability is indus-
trially caused (covered by vV orkmen's Compensation Act) 
and where it is not so caused (covered by Unemployment 
Insurance Act), but that he shall not be entitled to unemploy-
ment compensation disability benefits in addition to 1vorkmen's 
compensation for same period of unemployment, is manifest 
in substance of respective statutes. (See vVorkmen's Com-
pensation Act, Lab. Code, §§ 3202, 3208, 4903, par. (f), §§ 5000-
5003, 5100; Unemployment Insurance Act, 3 Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act 8780d, §§ 150, 207.) 
[3] Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-To make ef-
fective legislative intention that workman shall not be entitled 
to unemployment compensation disability benefits in addition 
to workmen's compensation for same period of unemployment, 
the Industrial Aecident Commission, pursuant to Lab. Code, 
§ 4903, par. (f), must allow a lien against workmen's com-
pensation for unemployment compensation disability benefits 
paid under Unemployment Insurance Act during a period 
when, pending determination by Industrial Accident Com-
mission of a claim for workmen's compensation, there was 
uncertainty whether benefits were payable under Workmen's 
Compensation Act or under Unemployment Insurance Act. 
[ 4] !d.-Construction: Unemployment Insurance-Construction of 
Statutes.-Both \Vorkmen's Compensation Act and Unemploy-
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Re-
lief-Insurance Act, § 3. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Unemployment Insurance, § 2; 
[3, 5, 8] Workmen's Compensation, § 197; [4] vVorkmen's Com-
pensation, § 9; Unemployment Insurance, § 3; [6] Workmen's 
Compensation, § 126; [7] Evidence, § 152. 
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ment Insurance Act are remedial statutes and are to be 
liberally construed for purpose of accomplishing their objects. 
[5] !d.-Liens on Award.-An agreement compromising a claim 
for compensation entered into between injured workman and 
workmen's compensation insurance carrier of his employer 
and approved by commission is workmen's compensation 
against which lien for unemployment disability benefits should 
be allowed. 
[6] !d.-Authority of Commission.-Final determinations whether 
an employe is entitled to workmen's compensation, amount 
of such compensation and period during which he is eligible 
therefor must be made by Industrial Accident Commission. 
[7] Evidence-Burden of Proof-Party on Whom Burden Lies.-
While ordinarily burden of proving every element of a claim 
is on one who asserts it, for practical reasons burden of ex-
planation or of going forward with evidence is sometimes 
placed on a party-opponent who has information lacking to 
one who asserts and seeks to establish a fact. 
[8] Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-Where an agree-
ment between injured employe and employer's insurance 
carrier compromising a claim for compensation has been ap-
proved by Industrial Accident Commission and it was stipu-
lated that Department of Employment paid unemployment 
disability benefits for a certain period within the period 
covered by the claim for compensation, this is sufficient to 
show prima facie as against such employe and insurance 
carrier, in absence of evidence presumptively within their 
power to produce, that department's payments were for a 
period when employe was industrially disabled and that a 
fund existed against which a lien for such payments could 
and should attach; if there be any further showing as to 
nature and period of disability, it should come from employe 
or insurance carrier. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission granting lien. Award affirmed. 
Victor C. Rose, Eugene Marias, Herlihy & Herlihy and 
E. H. Herlihy for Petitioners. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, Everett A. Corten, 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Irving H. Perluss, 
Assistant Attorney General, William L. Shaw and Vincent 
P. Lafferty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents. 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Evidence, § 91 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 135 et seq. 
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SCHAUER, J.-Everardo Garcia, an applicant for work-
men's compensation, and Pacific Indemnity Company, carrier 
of the workmen's compensation insurance of Garcia's em-
ployer, seek review of an Industrial Accident Commission 
award of a lien (allowed pursuant to Lab. Code, § 4903, 
par. (f)) against $1,250 payable to Garcia under an 
agreement between him and Pacific compromising his claim 
for workmen's compensation. The lien claimant is the De-
partment of Employment of the State of California. It 
paid the employe unemployment compensation disability 
benefits during a period when, although it is not disputed 
that he was entitled to compensation from one source or the 
other, it was uncertain whether the benefits sh<mld be paid, 
on the one hand, under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 
or, on the other hand, under the \rv orkmen 's Compensation 
Act. rrhe subsequent compromise of the employe's claim for 
workmen's compensation was approved by the commission. 
There was no direct evidence before the commission as to 
whether the injury on account of which the employe claimed 
workmen's compensation was industrially caused and as to 
whether, if it was, it caused the disability during the period 
for which unemployment compensation disability benefits 
were paid. The employe and the workmen's compensation 
insurance carrier of the employer take the position that there 
was no evidence before the commission sufficient to support 
a finding on those matters, and that the Department of 
Employment, to establish its lien, must prove such matters. 
The commission and the department take the position that 
the employe and the insurance carrier, if they object to 
allowance of the lien, must show that it should be disallowed. 
We have concluded that the position of the commission and 
the department is correct. 
On August 3, 1950, the employe filed with the commission 
his application for adjustment of claim for an allegedly in-
dustrial injury which was sustained March 17, 1950. Also 
on August 3d the Department of Employment filed its request 
for allowance of lien on which was endorsed the employe's 
consent to such allowance. The department paid the em-
ploye unemployment compensation totaling $496 during the 
period from June 27 through October 16, 1950. 
Hearings on the claim before the commission were con-
tinued from time to time because the employe and the em-
ployer's insurance carrier were negotiating for a settlement. 
In March, 1952, the employe and the insurance carrier ex-
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ecuted a settlement agreement which recited that there was 
a dispute as to liability and compromised the employe's claims 
against the compensation insurance carrier for the sum of 
$1,250. The commission approved this settlement by an order 
which made no mention of the department's lien claim. 
At the department's request the matter was reopened for 
consideration of the lien claim in the light of this court's 
decision in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1952), 
38 Cal.2d 599 [244 P.2d 530], which decision became final 
after the commission had approved the settlement. At the 
hearing concerning the lien all the parties declined to intro-
duce evidence on the question whether, during the period 
when the department paid the unemployment disability ben-
efits, the employe was disabled by an industrial injury. The 
referee found that ''there is no evidence to establish that 
applicant [employe] has sustained any injury which arose 
out of and occurred in the course of his employment or that 
he suffered any period of disability as result of any such 
injury, nor is there any evidence that will establish that he 
is entitled to any compensation by reason of any such period 
of disability.'' However, it is not disputed that, as above 
recited, the claim for workmen's compensation was filed, 
such claim was compromised, and the compromise was ap-
proved by the commission. Upon the record the referee 
recommended and the commission ordered that the lien be 
granted. The employe and the employer's insurance carrier 
exhausted their remedies before the commission, and this 
review proceeding followed. 
[1] In Bryant v. Industr1'al .Aec. Com. (1951), 37 Cal. 
2d 215, 218 [231 P.2d 32], we emphasized that the legisla-
tive purpose in providing unemployment disability benefits 
for periods and under circumstances not covered by work-
men's compensation obviously -vvas not to create duplicating 
compensations but, rather (in the language of the report of 
the Senate Interim Committee on Unemployment Insurance, 
Senate Journal, May 7, 1945, p. 126), was to provide an 
insurance program "to pay benefits to individuals who are 
unemployed because of illness or injury for which no com-
pensation is otherwise made." (Italics added.) [2] The 
legislative intention that a workman shall be compensated in 
part for the wage loss resulting from unemployment due to 
sickness or injury both where the elisa bility is industrially 
caused (covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act) and 
where it is not so caused (covered by the Unemployment 
Insurance Act), but that he shall not be entitled to unem-
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ployment compensation disability benefits in addition to 
workmen's compensation for the same period of unemploy-
ment, is manifest in the substance of the respective statutes. 
(See, e.g., "\Vorkmen 's Compensation Act, Lab. Code, § § 3202, 
3208, 4903, par. (f), §§ 5000-5003, 5100; Unemployment In-
surance Act, 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d, §§ 150, 207.) 
[3] In the Bryant case we further held that, to make the 
legislative intention effeetive, the Industrial Accident Com-
mission, pursuant to paragraph (£) of section 4903 of the 
Labor Code, must allow a lien against workmen's compensa-
tion for unemployment compensation disability benefits paid 
under the Unemployment Insurance Act during a period 
when, pending a determination by the Industrial Accident 
Commission of a claim for workmen's compensation, there 
was uncertainty whether benefits were payable under the 
\Vorkmen 's Compensation Act or under the Unemployment 
Insurance Act. 
[4] Both the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Un-
employment Insurance Act are remedial statutes and are 
to be liberally construed for the purpose of accomplishing 
their objects. Obviously, a primary and common object is 
the prompt cash assistance of a disabled workman. To that 
end, the immediate payment of benefits under the Unem-
ploym('nt Insurance Act where there is a question whether 
benefits are payable under the workmen's compensation law, 
is highly desirable. In the Aetna case (Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1952), supra, 38 Cal.2d 599, 603) 
we recognized that the proper conduct of the business of 
an insurance company carrying unemployment compensation 
disability benefit insurance would inevitably tend to make 
it delay payments to the workman in doubtful cases pending 
determination of the question as to whether the disability 
was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
unless such carrier could be assured that payments advanced 
under such circumstances would in all proper cases be recov-
erable upon determination of the controlling facts. [5] We 
specifically held (p. 604 of 38 Cal.2d) that an amount payable 
under an agreement compromising a claim for compensation 
entered into between the injured workman and the work-
men's compensation insurance carrier of his employer and 
approved by the commission was workmen's compensation 
against which the lien for unemployment disability benefits 
should be allowed. 
[6] The final determinations whether an employe is en-
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titled to workmen's compensation, the amount of such com-
pensation and the period during which he is eligible therefor, 
must be made by the Industrial Accident Commission. In 
the Aetna case the commission had nbt made such determi-
nations. This court (p. 605 of 38 Cal.2d.) directed that 
"if the parties, including Aetna [the unemployment insur-
ance carrier which claimed a lien there], cannot work out 
an agreement which effects a settlement of Aetna's claim, 
then the Industrial Accident Commission should determine 
the period of disability for which the employe is entitled 
to compensation and allow the claimed lien for the amounts 
of unemployment disability benefits paid during that period." 
As stated above, it is the position of the commission and 
the department that the lien claimant is not required to pro-
duce evidence on which the commission can find that "the 
employee is entitled to compensation.'' The department and 
the commission point out that there is great practical diffi-
culty in requiring the department to produce evidence of 
the industrial nature of the employe's injury and the period 
of his disability at a time long after the alleged injury and 
disability, where the employe who has first hand knowledge 
of those matters and the insurance carrier who has immediate 
opportunity to investigate them decline to produce such 
evidence and instead elect to compromise. [7] Ordinarily, 
as the employe and the insurance carrier argue, the burden 
of proving every element of a claim is on the one who asserts 
it. But for practical reasons the burden of explanation or 
of going forward with the evidence is sometimes placed on a 
party-opponent who has information lacking to the one who 
asserts and seeks to establish a fact. Familiar examples of 
this procedural device are the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
(see, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard (1944), 25 Cal.2d 486, 490 
[154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258] ; Dierman v. Providence 
Hospital (1947), 31 Cal.2d 290, 294 [188 P.2d 12]) and the 
use of special presumptions against a defendant in a criminal 
case where there is a rational connection between a fact 
proved by the prosecution and a presumed fact which can 
best be explained by the defendant (see, e.g., People v. Scott 
(1944), 24 Cal.2d 774, 779 [151 P.2d 517] ). 
[8] Here, it appears from the employe's application for 
adjustment of claim for workmen's compensation that he 
claimed an industrial injury which resulted in his leaving 
work on June 16, 1950; it was agreed between the employe 
and the workmen's compensation insurance carrier that the 
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employe was away from work until November, 1950; the 
employe's claim was compromised for a substantial sum, 
which compromise was approved by the commission; and it 
was stipulated that the department paid unemployment disa-
bility benefits from ,June 27, 1950, to October 16, 1950. 
This is sufficient to show prima faci.e, as against the employe 
who made the claim and his employer's workmen's compen-
sation insurance carrier, in the absence of evidence pre-
sumptively within their power to produce, that the depart-
ment's payments were for a period when the employe was 
industrially disabled, and that a fund existed against which 
the lien could and should attach. If there was to be any 
further showing as to the nature and period of the disability 
it should have come from the employe or the insurance 
carrier. 
For the reasons above stated the award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment for the reason 
that the record shows a claim for an industrial injury alleged 
to have occurred prior to the period during which Garcia 
received unemployment compensation disability benefits and 
an approved compromise of that claim. In such circumstances, 
the Industrial Accident Commission properly might infer that 
the disability was work connected and determine that the De-
partment of Employment had established a prima facie case 
for the amount of its claim. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I reiterate the views expressed in my dissents in Bryant v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215, 223 [231 P.2d 32], and 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. lndustTial Ace. Com., 38 Cal.2d 599, 
605 [241 P .2d 530]. In the latter case the majority held 
that a lien for unemployment disability payments must be 
allowed against the sum a workman was to receive for an 
injury under a compromise with his employer's insurance 
carrier. The present case goes one step further and holds 
that the employee has the burden of proving that the com-
promised claim was not compensable under the workmen's 
compensation laws even though it is the payor of the disa-
bility payments who is asserting the lien, and for him to 
be entitled to it, the disability must have been compensable 
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under the workmen's compensation laws. This is squarely 
contrary to section 5705 of the Labor Code, dealing with 
workmen's compensation, which provides that: ''The burden 
of proof rests upon the party holding the affirmative of the 
issue." (See, also, Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1981, 1869.) Hence 
the lien claimant had the burden of proving that the com-
promise payment was for an injury compensable under the 
workmen's compensation laws. To escape that proposition 
the majority reasons that the burden should be on the em-
ployee because he is better able to sustain it. While that 
may be true to some extent, the testimony of the employer 
and his employees and the data gathered as the result of 
any investigation made by the employer's insurance carrier 
are available equally to the lien claimant and the employee. 
It would seem to follow, therefore, that with reference to 
that source of evidence the employee is in no better position 
than the lien claimant. In any event it would seem that 
at least some burden rested upon the lien claimant to make 
a prima facie showing that the employee was in a position 
to produce evidence relating to the injury which was not 
available to the lien claimant. No such showing was made. 
In this state of the record, reliance by the majority upon 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur seems rather farfetched. 
In brief, we have here merely the assertion of a claim for 
workmen's compensation benefits by the employee, which 
claim was not pressed because of the compromise. We also 
have the assertion of a lien by the Department of Employ-
ment against the amount of the compromise. At this point 
the employee is claiming nothing with respect to compensa-
tion, but the majority says that the burden is on him to 
disprove that his injury was employment connected or a 
lien will attach. Of course, the majority would not hold 
that the mere assertion of a claim for workmen's compensa-
tion by an employee creates a presumption of its validity, 
as such holding would place an undue burden upon the 
employer and his insurance carrier. Yet the effect of the 
majority holding in the case at bar is to create such a pre-
sumption. But it is created for the purpose of defeating 
rather than supporting the claim of the employee. Thus a 
law which was designed to protect the interests of injured 
employees is construed to defeat their interests. 
The majority also advances the specious argument that 
unless every claim of lien for disability benefits is allowed 
against awards for workmen's compensation the payment of 
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disability benefits will be delayed to the detriment of the 
injured employees. Why this result would obtain is not 
apparent. The statute defining who is entitled to disability 
benefits is clear (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1949 Supp., Act 
8780d, §§ 201, 205, 206.1, 207, 208). The provisions for 
payment of such benefits are also clear (Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1949 Supp., supra, Act 8780d, §§ 250-254). With respect 
to the purpose of the act, section 150 thereof provides: ''The 
purpose of this article is to compensate in part for the wage 
loss sustained by individuals unemployed because of sickness 
or injury and to reduce to a minimum the suffering caused 
by unemployment resulting therefrom. This article shall be 
construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate 
the evils and burdens which fall on the ~tnemployed and 
disabled worker and his family." (Emphasis added.) '!.'he 
majority would thwart this salutary purpose by suggesting 
to those responsible for the payment of unemployment com-
pensation disability benefits that payment of such benefits be 
delayed in cases where workmen's compensation is also claimed 
by the employee until the validity of such claim is deter-
mined. In refutation of this argument I venture to suggest 
that if such a practice should be pursued by those respon-
sible for the payment of such benefits, the Legislature would 
provide an appropriate penalty designed to correct such an 
evil. However, as I read the act, I can see no basis for the 
unwarranted suggestion contained in the majority opinion. 
Because there is no evidence on which a valid lien could 
be imposed on the amount covered by the compromise, I 
would annul the award. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing· was denied De-
cember 10, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
